Bicameralism, small states style by Anckar, Dag
                                              Small States & Territories, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018, pp. 55-68. 
Bicameralism, small states style 
Dag Anckar  
Professor Emeritus of Political Science 
Åbo Akademi University,  
Åbo, Finland  
E-mail: danckar@abo.fi 
 
Abstract: In principle, one would imagine that unicameral assemblies are more streamlined 
and effective than bicameral ones in terms of responding to the needs of small and cohesive 
societies. However, around one fourth of the world’s small states have introduced bicameral 
legislatures or have installed decentralisation or devolution measures to serve ends that are 
usually entrusted to the bicameral device. Moreover, a few small states operate legislatures in 
which representatives and Senators are seated in the same House, thus combining features of 
unicameralism and bicameralism alike. Interestingly, the preference of some small states for 
bicameralism proper or for decentralisation and devolution as bicameral substitutes may be 
understood as rational responses that either promote balance and moderation in a historical 
context of party political domination or represent autonomy policies in and for archipelagic 
small countries. 
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Introduction 
Views of the roles and functions of institutions in political life may differ and may 
therefore bring somewhat different research questions to the fore. A behavioural point of 
view describes political institutions as arenas within which political behaviour occurs: 
institutions are epiphenomena, reflections of their environment. In this view, the state is 
affected by society, and political conditions are dependent on the outcomes of social and 
economic conditions: political institutions are, so to speak, battlefields that serve as staging 
grounds for trials of strength. An institutional point of view, on the other hand, gives 
institutions more independent roles and even suggests that institutions should be treated as 
political actors. Of course, this view may be questioned on the ground that institutions do not 
express sufficiently coherent patterns of behaviour to qualify as collective actors; however, a 
pragmatic answer to this remark is that the coherence of institutions varies but is sometimes 
substantial enough to justify viewing a collectivity as acting coherently (March and Olsen, 
1989, p. 18). While different in emphasis, the two perspectives may still overlap and be 
regarded as approaches that complement rather than exclude each other. 
Framed by such general reflections, this article examines the use of bicameralism in 
small states, the primary goal being to advance an understanding of the reasons why and the 
extent to which small states maintain and apply such a device. In principle, one would join 
Andrew Heywood in imaging that unicameral assemblies are more streamlined and effective 
than bicameral ones in terms of responding to the needs of small and relatively cohesive 
societies (Heywood, 1997, p. 22). Also, the focus on the bicameral device represents a 
contribution to a field that is yet not fully explored. In terms of number and share, 
unicameralism has had the better of bicameralism: according to a recent count, against 78 
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bicameral countries in the world are 115 unicameral countries (IPU Parline, 2018). There has, 
however, lately been in the world an increase in the number of bicameral chambers: one title 
in the literature announces “The strange revival of bicameralism” (Coakley, 2014). Still, 
scholarly interest has mainly been directed on first chambers; second chambers have 
remained “relatively little-studied institutions” (Russell, 2001, p. 442). This article, therefore, 
aims also to address the research gap and supplement the general literature on the 
bicameralism device (e.g. Heller and Branduse, 2014; Patterson and Mughan, 1999; Money 
and Tsebelis, 1992; Shell, 2001; Swendon, 2004; Tsebelis and Money, 1997). 
Bicameralism in small states: appearances and absences 
Utilising data from an earlier study (Anckar, 1998, p. 368), this paper records a list of 
the bicameral small states in the world at that time of writing. Another list gives similar data 
from new research at the now actual time of writing (2018), and a comparison of the two lists 
invites several comments and reflections. However, before going into analysis two short 
comments on matters of method must be inserted: 
First, there remains the always intricate matter of operationalizing smallness: by what 
criteria and what thresholds? Here, small states are defined as those with a resident 
population of no more than one million people; also because the 1998 study mentioned above 
made use of the same criterion and so a valid comparison is possible. The population data 
that are needed for identifying micro-states in the world of today are drawn for the year 2015 
from information provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (United Nations); data on the practice of bicameralism in the micro-states and 
corresponding territories of the contemporary world are from available Wikipedia data, edited 
November 15, 2017 (List of Legislatures). 
Second, some legislatures that are typically defined as formally unicameral may in 
fact resemble bicameral ones (Norton, 2004). This observation carries some weight in the 
small states universe as well. The small island state of St Vincent and the Grenadines has a 
unicameral parliament, the composition of which, however, has bicameral features: there are 
in parliament 15 elected members and six senators, four of the senators being appointed on 
the advice of the Prime Minister and two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition 
(Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1999, p. 320). Dominica makes use of a similar method: its 
parliament consists of 21 elected members and nine senators, five appointed on the advice of 
the Prime Minister and four appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition (Bojarra, 
2007, p. 260). While certainly incorporating elements of a bicameral design, the method, 
however, places representatives and Senators in the same House, and this unorthodox 
arrangement carries the implication that there are no shuttle systems and stoppping rules 
commonly used in bicameral systems for resolving disagreements between the two houses. It 
is therefore argued here, although with some hesitation, that the cases of Dominica and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines do not qualify for inclusion in the bicameral camp. The above 
reasoning excludes also the Federated States of Micronesia, the Congress of which has one 
member from each of the four states elected every four years and one or more members from 
each state apportioned accordingly to population and elected every two years. Senators and 
representatives sit again in the same House, and the fact that the legislative process also 
reflects a compromise between representation of states and of population (e.g. Burdick, 1988, 
pp. 265-266) adds to the complexity and non-transparency of the system: a pertinent 
comment is that “it remains to be seen whether the FSM has managed to avoid bicameralism 
only at the expense of other rigidities and complexities” (Ghai, 1988, p. 63). 
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This being said, the information from the lists of small bicameral states may be 
summarised as follows:  
First, any revival, strange or not, of bicameralism does not appear in the small states 
group. The mapping from the late 1990s suggests that there were at that time 43 microstates 
in the world, ten of which maintained a bicameral legislature. These ten states were: Antigua-
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Comoros, Fiji, Grenada, Palau, St Lucia, and 
Swaziland. The corresponding mapping from the present time of writing finds out that there 
are now 40 microstates, Bahrain, Cyprus, Qatar and Swaziland having disappeared from the 
set in consequence of population growth, and Montenegro being a microstate newcomer. 
Eight of the remaining 40 small states now have bicameral legislatures: Antigua-Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Grenada, Palau, and St Lucia. The proportions, then, are 
fairly similar; at both points of time, about one fifth of the parliaments in question express 
bicameralism.  
Let it be added that the proportion remains even smaller when and if the analysis is 
extended to cover small non-sovereign countries, dependencies and other territories – of in all 
47 such non-sovereign countries and territories, only five have installed a bicameral 
legislature (List of Legislatures): American Samoa, Bermuda, Isle of Man, Northern Mariana 
Islands and Puerto Rico. Of these, Puerto Rico, at over 3 million population, is oversized in 
terms of the criteria used here. Featuring in a manner of speaking three houses, the 
Parliament of the Isle of Man represents a very special kind of bicameralism (King, 2013; 
Ahlbom, 2014). And to add still one observation: of a dozen of legislatures of non-UN states, 
including unrecognized and disputed territories, only one, namely the legislature of clearly 
oversized Somaliland, a forgotten country which probably has a more democratic mode of 
governance than other parts of the Horn of Africa (Kaplan, 2008), practises bicameralism 
(List of Legislatures). In sum, then, as expected, small size is not conducive to bicameralism. 
Furthermore, the small states group does not to any noteworthy degree stand for 
change and mobility. Bicameral reforms do not occur frequently.  Rather the opposite is true: 
more or less the same constellation of countries make up the collection of small bicameral 
states at both points of time: bicameral legislatures were to be found in the late 1990s as well 
as some twenty years later in Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Palau 
and St Lucia. There are in fact between the two points of observation only three changes to be 
entered in the books:  two countries, Comoros and Fiji, have switched from bicameralism to 
unicameralism, and one country, namely Bhutan, has switched from unicameralism to 
bicameralism. Interestingly, the switches, while dissimilar in direction, still appear to relate 
positively to an advancement of an orderly and democratic political life. The introduction in 
Fiji in 2013 of a new constitution which vests legislative authority in a single-chamber 
Parliament has for the time being at least put an end to earlier and fatal developments 
characterized as “Fiji’s constitutional conundrum” (Lal, 2003). Whereas in Bhutan, the 
bicameral device was introduced in the 2005 draft constitution (Hutt, 2006, pp. 120-124), 
later to be inscribed into the 2008 Constitution and became part of a reform that established a 
two-party democracy and much reduced the power of the King. Looking further at the above 
listings, a small handful of countries that were classified in 1998 have later become over-
sized and thereby disappeared from the size frame of this investigation. However, the only 
case of these that involves bicameralism is Swaziland, bicameral at both points of time and 
applying a version of bicameralism that does no really count for much: Libandla, the 
parliament, is weak and its functions are limited to debating and advising the King. Libandla 
has been characterised as a “compromised hybrid”, distinguished by a “superimposition of 
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authoritarian monarchism on to a template of modern representative democracy” (Booysen, 
2013, p. 81). 
Why, then, have the few cases of bicameralism in small states opted for this unwieldy 
and inconvenient method of organising parliamentary life? What considerations have been 
decisive, and is there a pattern? 
Several reasons may be identified for the creation of bicameralism (e.g. Riker, 1992, 
pp. 101-115; Lijphart, 1999, pp. 203-211; Baldwin, 2001, pp. 172-175). Yet, the many 
distinctions boil down to two main considerations. One is about interest representation and 
the resolving of conflicts emanating from regional and other distinct interests, whereas the 
second is rather about review and delay and thereby about legislative quality assurance: “the 
Senate is meant to provide a sober second look at legislation”, it is said in an exposé of 
Bermuda’s legislature (Brown, 2013, p. 100).  
Obviously, operational methods for deciding classification in one or the other of these 
two categories shall preferably focus on recruitment: if and when second chambers are 
created for the purpose of accommodating regional and particular interests, it follows that 
such chambers must come about by methods that restrict an overall representative basis and 
put an emphasis, instead, on a regional or otherwise specific basis. On the other hand, 
moderation chambers are typically formed by methods that give priority to an overall 
representative basis. One typical example from the moderation genre is the case of St Lucia, 
where the Senate has 11 members, six being appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
three being appointed on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and two being appointed 
after consultation with religious, economic, and social groups. More or less the same model 
applies to Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, and Grenada: for instance, in Belize the Senate 
has eight members, five appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, two on the advice of 
the Leader of the Opposition, and one after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council 
(Fernandez, 1989, p. 50).  
Thus, similar methods are used by several cases, which are moreover predominantly 
former British colonies. This may suggest that small states bicameralism is nothing more than 
downright diffusion, the taking over by small recipients of institutional traits from a colonial 
power.  However, while there is certainly a good deal of truth to the diffusion hypothesis, it is 
not universal: there are former small British colonies, like Dominica, Fiji, Guyana, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, and others which have not imported the bicameral device proper. Other 
considerations are relevant and apply; these deal with rationality and calculation. In one 
instructive example, Laundy notes that one opposition member was returned in 1984 at the 
first general election to take place in Grenada following the restoration of parliamentary 
government in that country, and he maintains that this one member as Leader of the 
Opposition was entitled to nominate three members to the Senate, thus improving the 
equilibrium in the balance of representation (Laundy, 1989, p. 10). One idea that follows 
naturally from the Laundy line of reasoning and is also open to empirical investigation, is that 
a moderating and balancing bicameralism applies in countries which, at the dawn of 
independence and constitution-making, had experienced party systems with politcal parties 
that had dominated the domestic political scene, to the serious disadvantage of other political 
groups. In such countries, so the reasoning goes, the search will be for institutional and 
constitutional means to balance the future distribution of power.  
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Bicameral Antigua-Barbuda, independent in 1981, is a case in point: the Antigua 
Labour Party has held power since 1946 (except for 1971-1976). For another example, take 
the case of bicameral Belize, independent in 1981, where in the 1965 elections the People’s 
United Party won 16 seats out of 18, the share increasing to 17 seats in 1969 (Anckar, 1998, 
pp. 373-375).  
A dominating party pattern is in fact a valid basis for explanation: of the then such 
cases of party dominance almost all displayed bicameralism, and, on the other hand, of the 
bicameral cases almost all exhibited a history of specific political party dominance (Anckar, 
1998, pp. 374-375). A causal link can thus be suggested between such party dominance and 
dual legislature; because the composition of the contemporary bicameral small states group is 
still very much the same as it was at the earlier occasion, the lead conclusion should also 
remain much the same.   
Still, in the group of bicameral small countries are two members that do not fit the 
above explanatory pattern as the upper chambers of these two countries are as a whole or in 
the main elected by the people. In Bhutan, The National Council has 25 members, one 
directly elected from each of 20 districts and five appointed by the King, and in Palau all 
members of the Senate are elected by the people, the number of members being determined at 
each election by the Congressional Reapportionment Commission. While these arrangements 
may be looked upon as manifestations of a majority rule, they are in effect in rather poor 
conformity with prevailing cultural and ideological dispositions. In Bhutan, a tradition of 
mediation is still prevalent and confrontation is abhorred and shunned as a solution to 
conflicts; a system therefore prevails where consensus is the prevailing mode of government 
(Mathou, 2009, pp. 232-233). In Palau, as evident from research, the introduction of Western 
institutions has not supplanted Palauan culture and traditions (Veenendaal, 2014, pp. 201-
202). 
In sum, designing bicameralism in the world of small states has been tantamount to 
creating to some extent an arena for balancing political power relations. It is more doubtful if 
and to what extent this arena has been given full actor capacities – the appointments of 
senators in the above countries can be revoked at any time, and all senatorial positions 
automatically become vacant at a dissolution of parliament (Ghany, 2013, p. 25).  
Bicameral substitutes 
One approach that follows from an institutional perspective maintains that 
institutional choices may be explained by the overall institutional design of the country in 
question, this meaning that constitutional choices are dependent on each other, the choice of 
one device following naturally from the choice of another (Lundell, 2005, pp. 111-115). For 
instance, most federal systems are characterized by a bicameral chamber structure (Hague 
and Harrop, 2004, p. 229). This idea shall now be turned on its head, stating that an 
avoidance of some particular device may result from the preference of countries for some 
other device which serves the same purpose and may therefore replace the device in question. 
The rather abstracted and moderation-driven interest vested by microstates and small 
territories in the bicameral device proper suggests that matters of regional representation and 
visibility play a subordinate role only in the constitutional and political programmes and 
aspirations of small states. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Indeed, other methods 
than bicameralism are available: the most obvious of these deal with decentralisation and 
devolution, meaning that governments grant a certain amount of decision-making autonomy 
to lower levels. In other words, what follows is an attempt to find out to what extent small 
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states have substituted decentralisation and devolution for bicameralism in the face of 
territorial and other representation disputes. 
Admittedly, this point of departure may seem far-fetched and artificial. Explanations 
why some states and not others have accepted and installed an autonomy-recognizing 
territorial principle operate from an abundance of factors, and while some of these relate to 
characteristics of the state in question, other relate rather to characteristics of autonomous 
regions. Examples of explanations of this second type involve assumptions that territories 
gain in autonomy if they are at distance from their motherlands, have certain-sized 
populations, represent ethnic or religious peculiarities, are of a particular strategic 
importance, have the use of specific natural assets, and so on (Olausson, 2007, pp. 63-66). 
Evidently, the size of states may be thought of as a catch-all factor for many types of 
explanations. As a state gets larger, it must probably deal increasingly with varieties in terms 
of geography, history, population and economy that necessitate or at least strongly motivate 
that some part or parts of its territory receive special treatment and are awarded autonomy. 
On the other hand, if states are small-sized, the expectation would be that autonomy 
prerequisites are restricted, and if the state is very small, decentralisation measures appear 
superfluous and uncalled for. Indeed, a decentralised diminutive state appears almost a self-
contradiction and the ambition to seek in this realm for bicameral substitutes may be expected 
to prove a failure. 
Table 1: Patterns of bicameralism and devolution among small states. 
 
  Devolution? 
  Yes No 
Bicameralism? Yes Palau Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, 
Grenada, St Lucia 
No Comoros, Kiribati, 
Micronesia, St Kitts-Nevis, 
San Marino, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
Andorra, Brunei, Cape Verde, 
Djibouti, Dominica, 
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, 
Guyana, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Maldives, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Nauru, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Suriname, Tonga, 
Vatican City 
 
And yet, research suggests otherwise. Table 1 classifies the 40 microstates of the 
world today in a four-fold presentation that combines two dichotomously formed dimensions: 
small states have adopted the bicameral device or they have not; small states have adopted 
the devolution method or they have not. Data concerning the use of bicameralism have been 
inserted above in this presentation, and data on the use of the devolution device are from an 
available and fairly recent study (Anckar, 2009). As is evident from Table 1, most of today’s 
small states of today, 23 out of 40, do not engage at all in regional representation devices, be 
they about bicameralism or devolution. To repeat, then, it appears, unsurprisingly, that 
smallness as a rule discourages decentralisation. However, ten small countries have installed 
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institutional means to advance regional autonomy, and so there are several interesting 
exceptions to the rule. The countries can be divided into four sub-groups. 
One distinct sub-group is formed by several countries which are bicameral but do not 
apply other explicit devolution devices. In these countries upper house members of 
parliament are appointed in varying proportions on the advice of the Prime Minister, the 
Leader of the Opposition, and occasionally at the Governor-General’s discretion (Elkins and 
Ginsburg, 2011, p. 8; Ghany, 2013, p. 25). This group consists of predominantly 
Westminster-inspired small Caribbean states plus Bhutan; the states have, quite in the spirit 
of Westminster, abstained from introducing autonomy arrangements of any kind. 
A second set is formed by a handful of federal and semi-federal small states; here we 
find the federal cases of Palau, Comoros, Micronesia and St Kitts-Nevis (Anckar, 2003). This 
combination of federal government and small state status is astonishing and strange and the 
countries concerned seriously challenge the view that federal states are as a rule big states. 
Furthermore, the countries also challenge the common view of linking federalism to 
bicameralism. Only one of the countries, namely Palau, subscribes not only to the principle of 
devolution, but also to the principle of bicameralism proper, forming its own sub-group. In 
contrast, the other small federations have relinguished the institutional bicameralism device. 
Smallness nowithstanding the countries represent a spreading all over the field of federalism 
types - in fact, the categories of a “coming-together”, a “holding-together” and a “putting-
together” federalism which represent different historical and political logics (Stepan, 1999), 
are all represented in this somewhat peculiar small states group. 
Classifications of the Comoros can be equivocal in the literature, but the country 
constitutes a federal case (Sanaty, 2007, p. 213). According to the 2001 constitution, the 
Union of the Comoros is a republic that consists of four autonomous islands (Article 1); also, 
while respecting the Constitution of the Union, each island shall administer and manage its 
affairs freely and shall freely establish its status law (Article 7). Principles of federalism 
reflect also in the composition of the national legislature, as the unicameral Assembly of the 
Union consists of 24 representatives elected in single-member constituencies as well as of 
representatives of the autonomous islands appointed by the island councils from their ranks at 
the number of three for each island. Close to the group of federal states is also the African 
two-island state São Tomé and Príncipe, independent in 1975 from Portuguese rule. The 
country has two provinces, namely the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, Sao Tomé being 
divided into six districts, whereas Príncipe has one district only. Importantly, Principé enjoys 
since 1995 an extended autonomy. Namely, the island has a popularly elected parliament in 
which are vested considerable legislative powers. Furthermore, the island authorities also 
commands executive powers. Evidently, the government represents unmistakable features of 
federalism, and it is also the case that the somewhat priviledged position of Príncipe is to 
some extent federal in nature as the status may be seen as an attempt to cope with internal 
problems and a manifestation of a desire to keep the nation together (Hodges & Newitt, 1988, 
p. 110).  
In a fourth and final, somewhat disparate, sub-group are almost two dozen small 
countries which complete the cases of devolution. In Kiribati, a small Pacific island state, as 
reported in research, a gradual devolution of power has implemented through a system of 
island councils a policy of engaging and empowering people at the local level (Hassall and 
Tipu, 2008, p. 17). In Tuvalu, another small Pacific island state, likewise relying on 
participatory methods, the Falekaupule Act of 1997 has created an important autonomy 
mechanism to help build capacity for outer island development (Bell, 2008): the Act, in a 
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manner of speaking, operationalises the principle laid down already in the early Tuvaluan 
independence constitution that Parliament shall not proceed upon a Bill upon the next 
following session of Parliament so as to permit consideration of the Bill by Island Councils 
(Qalo, 1985, p. 206). Two Melanesian small island states, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
operate politico-administrative divisions based on provinces: Solomon Islands is divided into 
nine provinces and Vanuatu has since 1994 been divided into six provinces. These provinces 
enjoy constitutional and legal autonomy as well as satisfy indicators of formal autonomy to 
an extent that well justifies classifying Solomon Islands and Vanuatu among decentralisation 
cases. Also, in regards to Vanuatu, the task of preserving the role and functions of customs 
and custom chiefs is imposed on the provinces (e.g. Hassall, 2007, pp. 231-232). There is 
more doubt about the inclusion of San Marino, an enclave in Italy and the smallest republic in 
the world, among the set-up of decentralisation cases. The small territory of the country is 
divided into nine communes, called Giuente di Castello, which administer their own budgets, 
take care of local services and also have the right to interpellate the State Congress, the power 
of initiative and can propose referenda (Duursma, 1994, pp. 221-222). One relevant 
assessment is that the communes are “partially self-governing” (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 
1999, p. 23).  
Why, then, have the countries that have been reviewed above opted for devolution 
and decentralisation? Again, is there a pattern? The answer takes its point of departure from a 
set of three assertions that while focusing on geography assume that territorial non-contiguity 
stands out as a decisive factor: since almost all countries concerned are islands, non-
contiguity in practice implies an archipelagic geography. First, the condition of islandness 
probably promotes nationalism, in which case decentralisation becomes a means to manage 
the mental distances that follow in the heels of nationalism. Second, nationalism most likely 
promotes the wish to preserve and nurse traditions and identities in island populations: if so, 
decentralisation becomes a device that contributes to this goal. Thirdly, divided and distant 
geographies most likely render difficult a centralized management of governance and public 
administration; practical and organisational considerations therefore accentuate a need for 
decentralisation. Summing up: not only do physical features oblige rulers to treat territories as 
distinct administrative units, but islanders also tend to see themselves as distinct island 
communities (Baldacchino, 2000, p. 72; Royle and Dodds, 2003). The resulting hypothesis is 
that while small size stands out as a factor that render unnecessary attempts at 
decentralisation, this is not true with regards to small archipelagic geograhies, which on the 
contrary encourage and in many cases even oblige decentralisation policies and remedies. 
Findings indeed suggest that geography makes a difference. True, about half of the 
small states in the world are archipelagos, and many of these states, such as Cape Verde, 
Marshall Islands, Seychelles and Tonga, have refrained from introducing decentralisations 
and devolutions.  But, on the other hand, almost all decentralising small states have an 
archipelagic geography: the only exception is San Marino, although it is not hard to consider 
each of its hill-based communes as islands of sort. In conclusion, therefore: while all 
archipelagos do not resort to decentralisations, when and if such measures are taken, 
archipelagos are almost always involved. In other words: an archipelagic geography is not a 
sufficient condition to explain microstate decentralisation, but it comes very close to being a 
necessary condition. Of course, alternative explanatory factors need to be considered as they 
may distort the picture: small states perhaps introduce decentralisations rather in consequence 
of diffusion factors, like colonisation, or in consequence of politico-institutional factors, like 
electoral systems features, or in consequence, perhaps, of still other factors like an excessive 
ethnic diversity or a faulty democracy. However, research suggests that such other factors are 
not really helpful in explaining the inclination of some small states to operate decentralisation 
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and devolution. The diffusion aspect does not really work as former British colonies have in 
about equal proportions resorted to and not resorted to means of decentralisation; microstates 
that have installed decentralisation devices show no tendency to favor proportional or mixed 
electoral systems at the disadvantage of majority-enhancing plurality systems, ethnic 
diversity differences appear less decisive as are democracy level differences, and so on 
(Anckar, 2005, pp. 114-117).  
It is hard to escape the argument that non-contiguity makes a real difference which is 
about a broader involvement in institutions and practices of decentralisation and devolution. 
“Physical isolation can create a powerful sense of local community and accentuate 
differences of dialect and custom”, it is said in an introduction to an anthology on the 
political economy of small tropical islands (Newitt, 1992, p. 11); the implication of this being 
that the very factor that speaks against decentralisation, namely smallness, also, via its 
association with isolation, becomes a factor that accentuates the isolated position of the units 
in question and predispose these to receiving special treatment and decentralisation. At once 
large and small, such countries constitute, in a manner of speaking, “gigantic miniatures” 
(Anckar, 1994). Kiribati is a small country with a land area of some 800 km2; given 
alternative measures, however, the country emerges a giant as its exclusive economic zone is 
spread over 3.500.000 km2 of ocean water. Indeed, it is an apposite saying that Kiribati is “a 
nation of water” (Teiwaki, 1988). 
Conclusion 
An old political science handbook asserts that “people forget that institutions are not 
ends in themselves but tools for certain purposes, which should be discarded if the purpose is 
no longer achieved” (Soltau, 1951, p. 241). The same author also reminds us that “the trouble 
with all institutions is that they are by their very nature rigid and difficult both to adopt and to 
change” (Soltau, 1951, p. 240). The value of these two pithy observations is evident from the 
pages of this paper. The bicameralism device has been adopted or redefined among small 
states to function as means rather than ends and to facilitate the achievment of some specific 
smallness-related goal or goals, be they democracy, stability, the preservation of power 
positions, or the like. Furthermore, while it is true that institutions are as a rule installed to 
achieve defined purposes, discarding institutions that have become cumbersome or redundant 
in the course of time may for reasons of constitutional rigidity and inertia prove a tricky 
business, as is evident also from the infrequency of reform and mobility among small states 
that has been reported here. One example is how a proposed change to the constitution of St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, providing for a Senate elected via proportional representation, 
was rejected at a referendum in 2009: the text failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds 
majority required for ratification (Elkins and Ginsburg, 2011, p. 15).  
To sum up: bicameralism small states style has three distinguishing features. First, as 
might be expected, the institution of bicameralism proper is not much used by small states. 
Second, while bicameralism may in general serve several constitutional and political 
purposes, in the small states community bicameralism proper has been used foremostly to 
avoid ill-considered legislation. In small states bicameralism has offered pause, reflection and 
moderation, while functions of bicameralism in the spheres of interest representation and 
conflict resolving have been transferred to the domain of autonomy politics. Interestingly, 
this installation and use of bicameralism and bicameralism substitutes may reasonably be 
understood as expressions of rational consideration, as countries with a history of party-
political domination have installed policies that favour balance and moderation, and as 
several archipelagic small countries have implemented autonomy policies.  
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In spite of all this, the above references to rationality do not suggest that each and 
every calculation made in each and every country has explicitly concerned the relationship 
between dominance and constitutional devices or between geography and devolution. The 
references rather suggest that constitutional issues have been decided in a mental and political 
climate which promotes inclinations towards moderation, balance and autonomy.  
As suggested by this study, small size is probably a contributing factor that has 
motivated states to seek for alternatives to a bicameralism proper. Small size namely implies 
small-sized legislatures (e.g. Dahl and Tufte, 1973, pp. 80-84; Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 
1999, pp. 74-79), and the division of, for instance, the Tuvalu 15-member Parliament into 
two houses, would appear a cumbersome and over-stretched solution. A much wiser solution 
which takes care of the representation problem that follows from Tuvaluan non-contiguity is 
to apply autonomy policies that serve to neutralise any awkward consequences that may 
follow from an extended and distant geography. 
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